Introduction
In recent years, countries have put a lot on emphasis on financial sector reforms as a means to improve the overall functioning of the sector. Such reforms have encompassed a significant gamut of measures, including lowering of statutory reserve requirements, deregulation of interest rates, introduction of measures relating to income recognition, loan classification and provisioning, allowing more liberal entry of foreign banks and diversifying the ownership base of state-owned banks. The evidence emanating from empirical research is admittedly mixed. One set of studies find that financial deregulation leads to an increase in the resilience and performance of the banking sector (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Das and Ghosh, 2006; Yeyati and Micco, 2007) , while others find that the net effect of financial deregulation on the banking sector to be negative (Keeley, 1990; Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 1996; Wheelock and Wilson, 1999) .
The existing literature tends to look at each measure of prudential regulation measure in isolation, thereby ignoring the effect of these measures on bank performance. None of the studies take a holistic view on the joint effect of different policy dimensions of prudential regulation on bank performance. As Allen and Gale (2004) observe, since the aspects of performance, stability, efficiency and soundness of banks are inter-related, careful consideration of all important prudential measures is important for sound empirical analysis.
In this context, the paper investigates how various measures of macroprudential regulation affect the performance of the banking sector. More specifically, we consider the impact of three major policy dimensions of macroprudential regulationcapital adequacy ratio, provisioning norms and loan classification requirements -on the performance of the Indian banking system. We employ four indicators on which to assess the impact: return on asset (RoA) as the profitability measure, net interest margin (NIM) as the measure of economic efficiency, Z-score as the measure of bank stability and finally, advances growth (Gr_Adv) as a measure of bank business.
The paper combines several strands of literature. The first strand is the effect of macroprudential measures on bank performance. Second, the paper is related to the literature on the evolution of the Indian banking sector in the post-deregulation era and on the characterization of the state-owned banks in India (Banerjee et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2008; Gormley, 2010; Cole, 2011) . Finally, this study belongs to the literature which investigates the within-country effects of changes in regulation (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; Ediz et al., 1998; Stolz, 2007) and to a wider literature which identifies the effects of regulations based on cross-country analysis (Murinde and Yaseen, 2006; Van Roy, 2008; Cosimano and Hakura, 2011) .
The remainder of the paper continues as follows. We follow up with the literature, the data and methods, and thereafter, a discussion of the results. The final section concludes.
Literature Review
A significant body of literature has examined the impact of deregulation on bank behavior. It is possible to broadly distinguish two strands of literature. The first is primarily theoretical in nature, while the second is more empirical in its scope.
The theoretical literature has focused on the interrelationship among financial deregulation, market power and risk-taking by banks. Hellmann et al. (2001) contend that capital requirements alone may not be enough to curtail bank risk and additional requirements could be useful to reduce risk in a competitive environment. Rajan (2000, 2001) suggest that the optimal bank capital structure trades off liquidity creation and bank distress.
Empirical research into the above models report mixed findings. According to the first strand, the impact of financial deregulation is typically assessed either through a dummy variable (Salas and Saurina, 2003) or simply examining the behavior of banks during periods of financial deregulation (Das and Ghosh, 2006) . The findings indicate that the impact of deregulation on bank behavior depends, among others, on the state of the banking system and differs significantly across bank ownership.
The second strand of the literature focuses on the impact of financial deregulation on bank performance. Cross-country studies (Maudos and Pastor, 2001 ) report improvements in performance, post-financial deregulation. However, given the inherent difficulties inherent in cross-country comparisons, studies have also been conducted at the country-level. At the country level, studies have examined, among others, the performance of banks in the US (Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1995; Wheelock and Wilson, 1999) , Norway (Berg et al., 1992) , Thailand (Leightner, 1997), Korea (Gilbert and Wilson, 1998) and Taiwan (Shyu, 1998) .
These studies suffer from two major limitations. First, they focus on a catch-all measure, thereby ignoring the impact of specific policy dimensions of deregulation. Second, most studies examine the impact of financial deregulation on efficiency and productivity, neglecting other measures of bank performance, such as profitability and soundness. Partly as a response to these concerns, two sets of studies have emerged. The first examines the impact of specific regulatory reforms on various facets of bank performance. The second set examines the impact of financial deregulation on alternate measures of bank performance.
As regards the former, Kwan (2002) focused on the impact of interest rate financial deregulation in bank performance in Hong Kong. The study observed that interest rate deregulation led to significant decline in bank market values. Others have examined the impact of possible changes in prudential norms for loan classification on banks' credit portfolio (Das and Ghosh, 2007) .
A second set of studies explore the impact of financial deregulation on alternate measures of bank performance. For instance, several studies investigate the determinants of bank profitability or net interest margins (Demirguc Kunt and Huizinga, 2000; Demirguc Kunt et al., 2003; Maudos and Solis, 2009 ), bank stability indicators (Ianotta et al., 2007; Beck et al., 2009) , These studies veer around the view that financial deregulation generally has a positive effect on performance.
The study which comes closest to the spirit of the present analysis is IMF (2012). Employing crossnational data on 36 countries for the period 2000-11, the analysis examined the impact of several macroprudential instruments on both financial and real variables. 1 The results appear to suggest statistically significant effects for both capital requirements and reserve requirements on credit growth.
In terms of real variables, the results point to the fact that limits on LTV ratio exerts a non-negligible impact on output growth.
Although there are certain similarities between that study and the present one, there are also important differences. First, unlike the IMF (2013) study, the present article focuses on a single country.
This enables us to bypass issues of data comparability that often plagues cross-country studies (Honohan, 2008) . Second, the comparison of institutional and political characteristics across countries can be rendered difficult due to the diversity in their historical experiences, cultural norms and institutional contexts. Focusing on a single country enables to bypass the limitations of cross-country studies (Rodrik, 2005) . Third, the set of macroprudential instruments considered across the two sets of studies is significantly different. And finally, we explore the differential impact of macroprudential variables across bank ownership, an aspect not addressed by IMF (2013). This paper seeks to fill the gap in the literature and to shed further light on the evidence in the context of various measures of macroprudential regulation and banking in India during 1992-2012. SOBs. Their average RoA is 0.6%, which is around 50% lower than that obtaining for DPBs and roughly half as compared to FBs. All these differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
The database and sample
The results on Z-score and credit growth 2 are no less striking. 3 FBs have statistically significant lower Zscore as well as credit growth as compared to other bank groups. To illustrate, credit growth for FBs is roughly 9%, which is significantly lower as compared to 14.3% growth obtaining for DPBs. Overall, the results in table 3 appear to suggest that FBs have the highest margins and profitability, although their stability and credit growth are the lowest across ownership. (2000) and Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) and Micco et al. (2007) , measures of performance are regressed on a set of controls (X) included with a lag to account for endogeneity. The regression specification for bank s at time t is specified according as:
In (1), Perf is the performance measure, which is regressed on a set of lagged bank-level controls (X) and η t are year fixed effects. All expressions control for the impact of mergers (dy_merger). We run the regressions with and without the ownership dummy (OD) to ascertain its impact on bank performance.
Finally, ν is the error term.
We estimate the impact of explanatory variables on performance by fixed effects panel regressions.
Throughout, inference is based on standard errors that are clustered at the bank level.
The bank-specific variables include (log of) total assets (LTA), bank-wise asset share (SHTA) in a given
year, demand deposits (DDEP) and fee income (NINT). Following Berger et al. (2005) , we include both LTA and SHTA. Among the other variables, DDEP takes into account for banks' funding structure (SOBs tend to rely more on retail deposits as compared to other bank groups) whereas NINT accounts for banks' income diversification (foreign banks tend to rely more on non-interest income).
Results and Discussion
In Table 2 , across the first two sets of specifications, the coefficient on demand deposits is significant and positive, suggesting that banks with greater retail dependence have higher profitability and margins. In the baseline specification, it is observed that a 10% increase in retail dependence improves RoA by nearly 0.3 percentage points. One reason for this could be the low (or, negligible) cost of such deposits, which enables banks to earn higher margins and profitability on such funds. Banks with higher fee incomes are able to generate higher profitability, as expected.
Bigger banks appear to exhibit greater stability. These findings are consistent with Beck et al. (2009) who find that bank size exerts a positive impact on stability. Credit growth is slower for big banks, suggestive of the fact that smaller banks increase credit at a faster pace to gain market share.
When we include bank ownership, it is observed that as compared to DPBs, FBs have lower credit growth and stability. The effect is quantitatively important, indicating that the average foreign bank has a credit growth that is 0.08% points lower as compared to an average domestic private bank.
Considering that the average credit growth in the sample is 11%, this is a sizeable difference. 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 
The role of macroprudential regulation
The previous discussion indicates that FBs display lower stability and exhibit lower credit growth as compared to DPBs. The analysis does not highlight how specific macroprudential measures impact bank performance. To investigate this further, we check whether macroprudential regulation affects the relationship between ownership and performance by estimating equations of the following form:
In (2), GDPGR measures the real GDP growth in year t, and PRU (PRU=CRAR, LOAN, PROV) is the particular macroprudential measure; the remaining variables are as defined in Eq. (1).
Our main coefficient of interest is α 3 . The coefficient measures the impact of implementation of a given macroprudential measure on state-owned banks (the main effect of macroprudential norms is controlled through year effects). We control for the interaction between ownership and GDP growth, because state-owned and foreign banks might respond differently to the business cycle as compared to domestic private banks. This would not be a problem if the business cycles were uncorrelated with the prudential measures, although such a correlation cannot be ruled out . Table 3 reports the results for return on asset, interest margins, soundness and credit growth. Take for instance, Column 1. The results suggest that, as compared with DPBs, SOBs have higher profitability during periods of economic expansion although their profitability is reduced after imposition of capital adequacy norms. The impact of the macroprudential measure is economically meaningful, as well. To see this, consider the differential in profitability of the average SOB and the average DPB in a year in which real GDP grew by 6.7%, the average growth rate in the sample. Ignoring the impact of the tightening of capital standards, the differential is equals to 0.011% points [=-0.019+0.067*(0.125)].
Taking on board the impact of capital adequacy norms, the point estimates of Col. 1 yield a difference of 0.023% points [=-0.019+0.067*(0.125)-0.012], an increase of over 100% with respect to the nocapital imposition benchmark. In a similar fashion, in case of both loan classification and provisioning practices (Cols. 2 and 3), the difference in profitability works out to be 85% and 62%, respectively. Period 1992 Period -2012 Period 1992 Period -2012 Period 1992 Period -2012 Period 1992 Period -2012 Period 1992 Period -2012 Period 1992 Period -2012 Similar results are echoed when we focus on interest margins. More specifically, the evidence indicates that interest margins of SOBs tend to be higher during periods of economic expansion and lower after imposition of macroprudential norms. Again, the coefficient on the macroprudential dummy is quite large and indicates that the differential between the interest margin of state-owned and private banks more than quadruples after imposition of capital adequacy norms (assuming 6.7% GDP growth, the two values are -0.003 and -0.015). Similar, although of slightly lower order of magnitude, are in evidence when the provisioning and loan classification norms are considered. This provides evidence that the macroprudential channel is at work: the decline in profitability is driven to an extent by the lower margins.
Cols.(7) to (9) focus on bank soundness. The evidence indicates that the soundness of SOBs declines during periods of economic growth, although macroprudential norms exert a salutary impact. More specifically, capital adequacy and provisioning norms improve soundness, whereas loan classification norms lower it. The magnitude of the macroprudential effect in all cases is extremely large. In case of provisioning norms for example, the point estimates indicate that the differential between the soundness of SOBs and DPBs halves after imposition of such norms (with 6.7% GDP growth, the two values are -0.38 and -0.17).
[ Table 7 here]
The final three columns focus on credit growth. In particular, we find that SOBs increase their loan growth after imposition of capital norms. In Col.10 for example, the differential between credit growth of SOBs and DPBs works out to be over 100% (the two values are equal to -0.003 and -0.007 respectively, assuming 6.7% GDP growth).
In other words, the evidence indicates that the state-owned banks are less profitable than private banks and the difference in performance is accentuated after imposition of macroprudential norms.
Summary and conclusions
Financial sector reforms in India, undertaken as part of the overall process of reforms since the early 1990s, were aimed at improving the efficiency and productivity of the financial sector. While there have
been several studies on bank performance, these papers do not pay adequate attention to the important policy dimensions of prudential deregulation and their impact on bank performance.
In this context, the present study employs panel data techniques to examine the impact of three important macroprudential measures -capital adequacy norms, provisioning requirements and tightening of loan classification norms -on the performance of Indian banks since the 1990. We focus on four major firm characteristics: profitability, margins, soundness and credit growth. The analysis indicates that the state-owned banks are less profitable than private banks and the difference in performance is accentuated after imposition of macroprudential norms. These results are quite robust.
It is apparent in simple univariate comparisons as well as in multivariate regressions that takes on board several control variables.
Summing up, the balance of evidence indicates that different measures of macroprudential regulation exert differential impact on banks across ownership. It, therefore, appears important for policymakers to take a holistic view of all prudential measures and their potential impact on the banking system in order to avoid possible pitfalls.
